Covered in sweat, and emerging from his Type 97 Medium Tank, Lieutenant Watanabe of the Imperial Japanese Army must have been surprised. Here he stood, at the Trolak bridge. Three hours ago it had been defended by a British Brigade. Now the British Brigade was destroyed, the entire British division and its defence on this axis had been unhinged and the road to Kuala Lumpur was open. It wasn’t supposed to be this easy. As Lieutenant Watanabe dismounted, the sound of fighting must have been close at hand. The young Troop Leader quickly realised the Trolak Bridge had been wired for reserve demolitions. He strode forward, drew his samurai sword and brought it down on the wires, saving the bridge from destruction. He quickly remounted his vehicle. Momentum was with him. The British were on the back foot. He would press home the attack into the next Brigade…
A Shock Action Case Study
The Battle of Slim River presents an excellent opportunity to examine the role of shock action in war. This article will use the experiences gained on the 2018 Australian Army Research Centre Staff Ride of Malaysia and Singapore conducted over 06-16 May 2018 to provide an understanding of the battle. This will allow the importance of shock action to be explained, a definition explored and to suggest a method to understand and employ shock action.
The Battle of Slim River
Arguably the decisive action of the Japanese invasion of Malaya and Singapore, the Battle of Slim River occurred on the 7thof January 1942. Just 30 days earlier, a Japanese invasion force under the command of Colonel Ando had landed in Southern Thailand. Narrow mobility corridors through the mountainous jungle terrain of Malaya constrained the Japanese forces’ prospects for seizing Fortress Singapore, 600 kilometres to their south. Yet despite this substantial obstacle, the Japanese moved quickly. British planners had expected to defend these mobility corridors with well-sited, division-sized defences; however, by means of shallow envelopments and rapidly-garnered momentum, the Japanese proved adept at routing large British formations.
With the British on the back foot and after a series of significant withdrawals, the fatigued Indian 11th Division found themselves at Slim River. The waterway represented the most significant obstacle to the Japanese advance on the Western coast of Malaya. Adapting to the Japanese tactics, the British division arrayed itself in depth along the road crossing Slim River. This would make further envelopments difficult and force the Japanese to fight on the road.
After initial probing attacks had identified the forward edge of this new British position near Slim River, the Japanese advanced guard commander sought to again turn the flanks of the British position. Instead, Major Shimada, the commander of a Japanese tank unit, strongly advocated for a penetration on axis led by armour. Colonel Ando agreed, and at 0330 h on the 7thof January 1942, a combined arms team consisting of 30 tanks, mounted infantry, and engineers, supported by light artillery, commenced their attack.
Forced to attack on a very narrow frontage, Major Shimada sought to achieve a rapid penetration in order to exploit their attack into unprepared rear areas. Using the low light of the early morning, supported by light guns that suppressed the forward British company, Japanese engineers moved forward and cleared the most significant obstacles on the main road. Major Shimada’s lead tank platoon, led by Lieutenant Watanabe, then broke into the first position. Poorly-laid obstacles and unprepared anti-tank guns allowed ground troops to guide vehicles through the remainder of the road block and the attack to achieve immediate success.
Capitalising on the momentum gained from this first contact, the armoured column rapidly assaulted subsequent companies of the 4th/19thHyderabad Battalion, using immediate bypass routes for any obstacles en route to retain the initiative. By 0630, the Japanese attack had captured the Trolak bridge intact and an entire British Brigade had been routed. Over the next two hours, the Japanese column would destroy a second Brigade, deploying machine gun fire to scythe down entire companies still in marching order and allowing the Japanese to capture their final objective, the Bridge over the Slim River.
The penetration was only stopped when a British battery of 25 pounder artillery, engaging with direct fire over open sights, was able to establish an effective block.
At this point, the entire British division’s defence had been unhinged. The Japanese penetration had secured the key bridges, routing any significant defences on route and allowing the main body of the Japanese 41st Infantry Regiment to advance in the wake of the attack and mop up any remaining resistance. The British would accede the next 300 kilometres of ground to the Japanese advance without a fight: the fate of the British in Malaya was sealed.
Yet a conventional understanding of the initial situation at Slim River would suggest the British should have been able to achieve considerable delay upon the Japanese, luring them into a battle of attrition. Instead, the Japanese conducted a decisive manoeuvre that destroyed British cohesion and left them vulnerable to exploitation by the rapid successive actions of Japanese forces. This Japanese victory can thus be attributed to shock action.
Defining Shock Action
Australian doctrine defines shock action in two key publications, LWD 3-0 and LWD 3-3-4, as outlined below.
LWD 3-0 Operations
“Shock Action is a physical and psychological assault on the enemy aimed at disrupting plans, destroying cohesion, sapping morale and weakening the will to resist. The application of shock action is characterised by speed, surprise and aggression.”
LWD 3-3-4 Employment of Armour
“Shock (Action) is the paralysing effect created by rapid and simultaneous actions that render an enemy incapable of making an effective response. Armour achieves shock by combining surprise, concentration of force and aggression (both physical and psychological). Shock action disrupts the enemy’s plans, destroys their cohesion, saps morale and weakens their will to resist. Shock action is most effective when directly targeted at the enemy’s centre of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.
The lack of wider acknowledgement of this tactic in other doctrine is surprising, given the importance of shock action in deciding the outcome of a conflict. When the enemy has a directly competing end state (e.g. Clear task vs Hold task) and symmetrical ways and means (e.g. similar levels of combat power), combat risks becoming attritional in nature. In The Art of War in the Western World, Archer Jones suggests that shock action is needed to make combat decisive, a view corroborated by Dr. Jim Storr’s assessment in The Human Face of War that achieving shock can reduce friendly casualties by 40%. It is a challenge to find examples of successful and decisive combat operations which don’t feature some element of shock.
Shock Action Explained
At Slim River, the 11thIndian Division would have experienced an ‘expanding torrent’ of shock effect, as the Japanese armoured column deeply penetrated their defensive position. This would have disintegrated any coherent will to resist at every level of command. To understand how this occurred, consider the following:
- A single event is unlikely to degrade enemy cohesion to such a degree that they become paralysed and ‘Shock Effect’ occurs.
- Single actions are likely to achieve temporal outcomes of shock with an opportunity for the enemy to reconstitute their cohesion and will to resist.
- Thus, in order to achieve decisive Shock Effect, “Rapid and simultaneous” ‘Shock Actions’ need to occur, denying the enemy opportunities to resist morally or physically. Figure 1 graphically represents this concept.
The Six Fundamental Factors of Shock Action
Using the Japanese example at the Slim River, it is evident that there are six fundamental methods of achieving shock that can then be synchronised and orchestrated to achieve shock action. These are surprise, tempo, controlled firepower, setting psychological preconditions, targeting the enemy’s centre of gravity (COG), and capitalising on partial successes.
Surprise can be achieved in three ways: at an unexpected location, at an unexpected time or through an unexpected functional grouping. At Slim River, the Imperial Japanese Army achieved considerable surprise, especially in the British depth battalions, by exploiting all three possible surprise avenues. The appearance of an armoured column, so deep within the division’s defensive position, and with no early warning exemplifies the accomplishment of surprise across the three methods stated above. The primacy of armour in engendering shock through surprise is highlighted by Dr. Storr, who suggests that, coupled with the right weather conditions, armour can be attributed to achieving shock 95% of the time.
Doctrinally, tempo is generated in two ways: mounting tempo and execution tempo. In general terms, mounting tempo can be generated through early and detailed warning orders, and a strong NCO culture around battle preparation. Execution tempo, as exemplified by the Japanese actions at Slim River, requires well-trained leaders with a bias for action and an understanding of the commanders’ intent in order to achieve decision superiority. Simply put, the Japanese made better decisions at a faster rate than the British. This allowed them to rapidly push through a series of subsequent British battle positions.
- Controlled Firepower
Heinz Guderian in Achtung-Panzer and LWD 3-3-4 The Employment of Armour specifically lists firepower as a means to achieve shock and comments on the importance of control. At Slim River, the large ammunition capacity of Japanese light and medium tanks allowed them to liberally employ machine gun fire and achieve effective suppression. In contemporary terminology, well-developed engagement areas, integration of indirect fires and rehearsed unit fire control can aid in the employment of firepower to achieve shock action.
- Psychological Preconditions
The ability to play on psychosomatic fears will enhance the effectiveness of any attempt to generate shock. At its simplest, light and weather conditions appropriate in a horror movie also support the psychological and perceptual conditions for an attack that would create shock. In the case study in question, the Indian Brigades had suffered significant loses in a series of defeats immediately prior to their attempted defence at Slim River, and it is likely many of the soldiers were scared of the Imperial Japanese Army’s prowess. This undoubtedly contributed to the onset of shock in many of the defensive positions.
- Targeting Enemy COG & Partial Successes
Targeting of the enemy Centre of Gravity (COG) is another crucial method for creating shock for enemy forces. At lower levels of command, the COG may not always be immediately apparent or targetable, and a well-considered High Value Target list is likely to achieve a similar effect. At higher levels, the identification and targeting of COG may rapidly create an expanding torrent of shock through ever higher echelons of command. In a related vein, S.L.A Marshall speaks of the disarming nature of success in command structures. Soldiers may not be mentally prepared for further combat after the achievement of an initial objective and may be at greater risk of being shocked themselves. The British forces may have felt that their new deployment in depth, and partial success in a previous delaying action at Kempar, represented a turning point in the campaign. The attack on axis therefore would have had a significantly psychological shock to the force. As a possible counter to the disarming nature of success, consideration should be given to the retention of a reserve, continued vigilance for enemy action, and the maintenance of offensive action to keep soldiers focused for combat.
- Simultaneous and Orchestrated Actions
In practical terms all available effects must be incorporated, synchronised in time and orchestrated in purpose. Only through ensuring the enemy does not have an opportunity to regain their cohesion is the full potential of Shock Action to be inflicted. Combat leaders should be encouraged to ensure they are appropriately positioned to exploit opportunity and reinforce success. A bias for action must be inculcated and an intuitive understanding of combat operations should be instilled in Officers. These attributes are clear in Major Shimada and the actions of the Japanese force at Slim River.
Shock action should be considered central to the achievement of decision in combat. This article has explored the success of the Japanese at Slim River on 7th January 1942 as a means to demonstrate and suggest six factors fundamental to the achievement of shock action in war.
During the period 6-16 May 18, the Australian Army Research Centre led a staff ride to enable participants to study significant actions fought during the 1941-42 Malaya-Singapore Campaign. The staff ride consisted of 13 Australian Army Captains and Majors from training institutions and allowed them to consider the potential relevance of this campaign to contemporary and future conflict.
About the Author
Cameron Gibbins is an Australian Army officer currently serving as the Tank Officer Instructor at the School of Armour.
- Dr Jim Storr, The Human Face of War, Birmingham War Studies, 2009.
- Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World,University of Illnois Press, 2001.
- 3-3-4 Employment of Armour
- 3-0-3 Formation Tactics
- L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire; The Problem of Battle Command, University of Oklahoma Press, 1947.
- Heinz Guderian , Achtung-Panzer; The Development of Tank Warfare, Cassell, 1937.
- Bruce Condell & David Zabecki, Truppenfuhrung: On the German Art of War, Stockpole Books, 2009.